UN
UNFPA Partnership Catalyst

How UNFPA Fits in the Wider SRHR Architecture

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

No single organisation "owns" sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) globally. The field is shared across multiple UN agencies, bilateral donors, multilateral development banks, international NGOs, and a growing number of multi-stakeholder platforms — each with different mandates, funding models, governance structures, and operational footprints. Understanding how UNFPA fits within this wider architecture is essential for anyone working in the space, whether as a funder, an implementer, a researcher, or a policymaker.

UNFPA is the designated UN lead on SRHR and population — the organisation mandated to implement the ICPD Programme of Action. But this designation coexists with WHO's authority to set clinical standards that everyone else implements; UNICEF's mandate to reach children and mothers; UN Women's cross-cutting gender equality mandate; UNAIDS's leadership on HIV; the World Bank's capacity to move orders-of-magnitude larger sums of money into health systems than any UN operational agency; and a large and growing ecosystem of bilateral donors and international NGOs that fund and implement SRHR programmes with or without UNFPA involvement.

The practical consequence is significant mandate overlap, coordination costs, and — in some contexts — competitive dynamics between organisations that officially describe themselves as complementary. Understanding where the lines between these actors run, where they blur, and where the genuine gaps are is the analytical task this document addresses. The most important gaps in the current architecture are: accountability for quality of care (as distinct from coverage); engagement with adolescent boys and young men; SRHR programming in middle-income countries as they graduate from ODA; and the climate-SRHR intersection, which is growing in importance but remains programmatically immature.

The H6 group — UNAIDS, UNFPA, UNICEF, UN Women, WHO, and the World Bank — provides the primary inter-agency coordination mechanism at global level. The H6 operates as a coordination forum rather than a governing body; it does not allocate resources or set binding joint priorities, but it produces joint publications, coordinates shared advocacy, and attempts to harmonise UN system positions in intergovernmental processes.

KEY FACTS

BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

The current SRHR architecture evolved through several decades of institutional layering rather than rational design. In the 1960s–1980s, population assistance was primarily bilateral (USAID dominant) and channelled through UNFPA. The HIV/AIDS epidemic from the 1980s created UNAIDS and a massive parallel funding stream that intersected with SRHR but had its own governance and institutions. The 1994 ICPD added rights-based framing and expanded UNFPA's mandate. The 2000s saw the creation of PMNCH, the Global Fund for AIDS, TB and Malaria, GAVI, and multiple other platforms — all claiming territory adjacent to or overlapping with SRHR.

The result is an architecture that some analysts characterise as "regime complex" (Raustiala and Victor 2004) — multiple overlapping institutions with different memberships, different rules, and different but partially aligned objectives. This complexity has benefits (multiple entry points for different actors; redundancy against single points of failure) and costs (coordination overhead; mandate overlap; accountability fragmentation).

The 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and subsequent agreements (Accra 2008, Busan 2011) tried to rationalise this complexity through principles of harmonisation and division of labour. In the SRHR space, the practical result has been the H6 mechanism at global level and UN Resident Coordinator-mediated UN Development Assistance Frameworks (UNDAFs) at country level. Neither has fully resolved the coordination challenges, but both have improved joint advocacy and reduced the most visible duplications.

DETAIL

The UN System Actors

WHO: The Rulemaker

WHO's relationship to UNFPA is the most foundational in the SRHR space. WHO is the primary standard-setting body for reproductive health, maternal health, and GBV clinical response. When UNFPA trains midwives, it trains them to WHO/ICM competency standards. When UNFPA designs EmONC programmes, it uses WHO's signal function framework. When UNFPA responds to sexual violence in emergencies, the clinical management of rape (CMR) protocol is WHO-derived. When UNFPA procures medicines, it sources from WHO-prequalified manufacturers.

The division "WHO makes the rules; UNFPA implements them" is broadly accurate but somewhat simplified. UNFPA also produces normative guidance in its own right — on population data, on humanitarian response standards, on rights-based approaches to family planning. And WHO does have country offices and engages in technical cooperation at country level. But the fundamental division of labour holds: WHO's country presence is primarily normative and advisory; UNFPA's is operational.

WHO's hosting of PMNCH is a significant institutional relationship. It gives PMNCH credibility in normative processes and access to WHO technical networks, while giving WHO a channel to the broader multi-stakeholder community. From UNFPA's perspective, PMNCH's WHO-hosted products carry normative weight that UNFPA's own guidance must engage with — even though UNFPA's operational experience and mandate may differ.

Key areas of UNFPA-WHO joint work:

UNICEF: The Closest Overlap

UNICEF is UNFPA's most overlapping UN agency partner. Both work on maternal and newborn health; both engage on adolescent health; both work on child marriage and FGM. The institutional division between them is partly by intervention level (UNICEF focuses more on the child and newborn; UNFPA on the mother and adolescent), but the overlap is genuinely large.

The most visible joint UNFPA-UNICEF programme is the programme to accelerate the abandonment of FGM, which has operated since 2008 across 17 priority countries in Africa. This joint programme is evidence that meaningful cooperation is possible, but it required a specific institutional investment to create joint governance, joint funding, and joint accountability — it did not emerge naturally from the co-existence of UNFPA and UNICEF in the same countries.

At country level, the UNFPA-UNICEF relationship can be competitive. Both organisations have country offices in the same countries, both engage with the same government ministries (especially the Ministry of Health), and both compete for earmarked donor funding in overlapping programme areas. The Competition is most visible in adolescent health, where both claim mandate and both produce programming. Country-level evaluations by IEO (for UNFPA) and UNICEF's own evaluations have documented this dynamic.

UN Women: The Gender Mandate

UN Women was established in 2010 through the merger of four UN gender entities. Its cross-cutting mandate on gender equality intersects with SRHR at multiple points: GBV prevention and response, harmful practices (child marriage, FGM), gender data, and women's economic empowerment.

UNFPA-UN Women coordination is most developed on GBV, where both have active programmes. In some humanitarian settings, UNFPA and UN Women co-lead GBV coordination functions. In development settings, the coordination is less structured, and mandate overlap — particularly on GBV prevention and gender norm change — can create duplication.

The principal difference: UNFPA has a specific SRHR mandate and an operational reproductive health programme; UN Women has a broader gender equality mandate without the specific SRHR operational focus. In practice, this means UNFPA typically takes the reproductive health angle and UN Women the gender equality angle, with overlap on GBV and harmful practices.

UNAIDS: The HIV-SRHR Interface

UNAIDS leads the global HIV/AIDS response, which intersects with SRHR through:

In countries with significant HIV burden (particularly sub-Saharan Africa), UNFPA-UNAIDS coordination is well-developed. UNFPA procures condoms and some HIV-related reproductive health commodities. Joint UN programming on HIV-SRHR integration is documented in several country UNDAFs.

UNAIDS's governance model is distinctive — it includes governments, UN system agencies (UNFPA is a UNAIDS co-sponsor), civil society (including people living with HIV), and academic institutions. The UNAIDS governance model has been influential in global health governance debates about multi-stakeholder participation.

World Bank: The Largest Money Mover

The World Bank's role in the SRHR architecture is fundamentally different from any UN operational agency — it is a financing institution, not a service provider. Its reproductive health and family planning engagement is primarily through:

The World Bank's annual health financing to recipient governments dwarfs the combined operational budgets of all UN SRHR agencies. In countries where the World Bank is a major health financier, its HNP priorities shape what health systems actually prioritise, what they build, and what they can afford — often more than UN normative guidance or UNFPA programme support.

UNFPA and the World Bank coordinate through H6 and through country-level UN-World Bank coordination mechanisms. But the relationship is fundamentally asymmetric: the Bank controls orders of magnitude more financing. UNFPA's influence on Bank-financed health systems is through technical assistance and normative advocacy rather than through resource leverage.

Key tension: The World Bank uses economic efficiency arguments for health investment (health as human capital; demographic dividend) that sometimes sit uncomfortably with UNFPA's rights-based framing. The Bank has moved toward rights-based language in its SRHR programming over time, partly under influence from UNFPA and civil society, but the underlying institutional logic of the Bank (economic returns on investment) differs from UNFPA's (rights as intrinsic, not instrumental).

The H6 Group: Inter-Agency Coordination

The H6 (sometimes called H6 or H-6) is the coordination mechanism for the six UN system bodies with the greatest stake in SRHR/MNCAH: UNAIDS, UNFPA, UNICEF, UN Women, WHO, and the World Bank. It operates at headquarters level through regular meetings of senior staff and produces:

The H6 is a voluntary coordination mechanism with no binding authority and no independent secretariat. It works when member organisations share a common interest in joint advocacy and when leadership champions it. It is less effective at resolving the genuine conflicts of interest between organisations (on mandate scope, on resource allocation, on policy positions) that arise at country level.

The relationship between the H6 and PMNCH is that PMNCH participates through WHO — it is not an H6 member in its own right. This means the broader multi-stakeholder community PMNCH represents (civil society, health professionals, private sector) is not directly represented in H6 deliberations.

Bilateral Donors

USAID (United States)

USAID is historically the single largest bilateral funder of reproductive health and family planning globally. In years when the Global Gag Rule is not in effect, USAID's bilateral reproductive health and family planning budget has ranged from approximately USD 600–700 million per year. This funding flows through UNFPA, but also through bilateral programmes managed directly by USAID, and through a large network of implementing partners (FHI 360, MSI, PSI, Population Council, CARE, etc.).

USAID's bilateral reproductive health approach is sometimes more flexible than UNFPA's can be — USAID can fund abortion services where legal through bilateral mechanisms, which UNFPA cannot do. This creates a division of labour in some country contexts: UNFPA manages government-to-government programme support; USAID bilateral funding flows through NGOs to reach services that UNFPA's mandate precludes.

The Global Gag Rule (officially the Mexico City Policy, first introduced by Reagan in 1985) restricts US foreign assistance to organisations that perform or actively promote abortion services. When in effect (under Reagan 1985–93, Bush 2001–2009, Trump first term 2017–2021, Trump second term from 2025), it affects UNFPA directly (through the parallel Kemp-Kasten amendment that restricts funding to organisations deemed to support coercive population programmes) and the broader NGO ecosystem (by restricting USAID bilateral funding to organisations like MSI and IPPF that provide or advocate for abortion services).

The impact of the Global Gag Rule on SRHR service delivery has been studied; Guttmacher and others have estimated millions of unintended pregnancies as a result of service disruption during Gag Rule periods.

FCDO (UK)

The UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office is one of the most consistently significant bilateral donors for SRHR globally and one of the most analytically engaged. FCDO (previously DFID) has:

FCDO's analytical engagement — particularly its multilateral aid reviews — is a useful intelligence source for anyone assessing UNFPA. These reviews are public and apply a structured analytical framework to assess UNFPA's performance, strategy, and value for money.

Nordic Bilateral Donors: Sida (Sweden), DANIDA (Denmark), Norad (Norway), Netherlands

The Nordic bilateral donors — Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and the Netherlands (not a Nordic country but aligned in this policy space) — are the backbone of core funding to UNFPA and to rights-based SRHR programming globally. They are characterised by:

Germany (through BMZ, the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, and KfW) has become UNFPA's largest single state donor in recent years, with contributions in the range of EUR 180–220 million annually. Germany's increased engagement reflects both its general increase in development assistance and its specific commitment to multilateral SRHR programming.

Japan has increased its contributions to UNFPA in recent years, particularly for maternal health, humanitarian response, and population data. Japan's engagement is somewhat different from European bilateral donors — it is less explicitly aligned with the rights-based framing and more focused on health outcomes and data — but it is a significant and growing contributor.

The European Commission

The EU as a body (through the European Commission, particularly DG DEVCO/DG INTPA and ECHO for humanitarian) is a significant UNFPA donor through both development and humanitarian instruments. EU contributions are often multi-year and substantial — making the Commission one of the more stable elements of UNFPA's funding base.

Major International NGO Implementers

Several large international NGOs operate in the same programme space as UNFPA, sometimes as implementing partners, sometimes as independent delivery networks:

MSI Reproductive Choices (formerly Marie Stopes International)

MSI is a UK-based international NGO focused specifically on contraception and abortion services. It operates its own service delivery networks — clinics, outreach programmes, social franchises — in over 37 countries, primarily in sub-Saharan Africa and South/Southeast Asia. Unlike UNFPA, MSI explicitly provides abortion services where legal and advocates for expanded abortion access. This distinction is significant: MSI serves the service delivery function that UNFPA's mandate precludes on abortion.

MSI receives funding from many of the same bilateral donors as UNFPA (including FCDO, USAID when not restricted, Netherlands) and from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. The Global Gag Rule, when in effect, particularly affects MSI because of its explicit abortion service provision and advocacy — illustrating how the same US political cycle that defunds UNFPA also defunds key NGO partners in the SRHR ecosystem.

IPPF (International Planned Parenthood Federation)

IPPF is a federation of national family planning associations operating in over 150 countries. It provides a range of SRH services including, through member associations where legal, abortion. IPPF explicitly advocates for reproductive rights including abortion access, which distinguishes its advocacy posture from UNFPA's more constrained institutional position.

IPPF and UNFPA are broadly aligned on the normative agenda (reproductive rights, rights-based family planning) but differ on the abortion advocacy question. IPPF's member associations are often UNFPA implementing partners at country level, particularly for community-level family planning services.

IPPF was significantly affected by the Global Gag Rule because of its member associations' abortion services and advocacy. During Gag Rule periods, IPPF-affiliated organisations have lost substantial USAID funding.

FHI 360

FHI 360 is a large US-based development organisation with significant reproductive health, HIV, adolescent health, and education programming. It is primarily an implementing partner — it executes USAID and other donor bilateral programmes and is often contracted to implement in the same countries where UNFPA has programmes. FHI 360 does not have the normative or advocacy posture of IPPF or MSI; it is a professional services organisation in the development sector.

PSI (Population Services International)

PSI focuses on social marketing of health products — contraceptives, HIV prevention commodities — across a large number of countries. Its model (low-cost branded products distributed through commercial channels rather than purely public sector) complements the public sector focus of UNFPA's commodity programming.

Population Council

The Population Council is a research-to-programme organisation based in New York with country offices in several high-burden countries. It conducts primary research on reproductive health, adolescent health, HIV, and gender — and uses that research to inform programme design. It is less visible than MSI or IPPF in service delivery terms but is one of the most credible research institutions in the field. Population Council has generated significant evidence on rights-based family planning quality (including research by Senderowicz and colleagues on contraceptive autonomy) and on adolescent health.

The Coordination Challenge at Country Level

At global level, the H6, PMNCH, and bilateral donor forums provide coordination infrastructure — imperfect but real. At country level, the coordination picture is considerably messier. In a country like Ethiopia or Bangladesh, a typical SRHR coordination landscape might include:

In this context, coordination is not optional — without it, duplication wastes resources and gaps leave beneficiaries underserved. But coordination has real costs: time spent in coordination forums is time not spent on programming; decisions made by consensus may be less evidence-based than decisions made by organisations acting on their own analysis; and the requirement to present a unified front may suppress important disagreements about programme approach.

IEO evaluations have consistently found that country-level coordination in UNFPA programmes consumes significant staff time. In larger multi-partner programmes, the coordination overhead can approach 20–30% of senior staff time. Whether this is a worthwhile investment or a structural inefficiency is a live debate in the development effectiveness community.

EVIDENCE BASE

The evidence on the effectiveness of the multi-actor SRHR architecture is limited but suggestive:

On fragmentation and duplication: The Paris Declaration monitoring surveys and the OECD-DAC evaluations of aid effectiveness found persistent evidence of fragmentation and duplication in aid delivery across sectors, including health. SRHR is not unique in this respect, and the evidence of harmful effects of fragmentation (as distinct from inefficiency) is weaker than advocates of rationalisation often claim.

On H6 effectiveness: No rigorous evaluation of the H6 as a coordination mechanism exists. Assessments of similar mechanisms (the UN Development Group; Joint UN programmes on AIDS) suggest that coordination bodies improve joint advocacy but are less effective at resolving competitive dynamics or driving genuinely integrated programming.

On the role of bilateral donors: The OECD-DAC peer reviews of major SRHR bilateral donors (USAID, FCDO, Sida) provide assessments of bilateral programme effectiveness. USAID's family planning programme evaluations (conducted by USAID's own evaluation mechanism) are among the most rigorous available for any bilateral in this space.

On NGO vs. UN implementation: The evidence that any particular implementation modality (UN agency vs. bilateral vs. NGO) systematically outperforms others in SRHR is thin. Context and capacity matter more than organisational type.

FUNDING AND RESOURCES

The total international SRHR financing landscape:

Source Approximate annual amount (USD) Notes
USAID bilateral reproductive health and family planning ~USD 600–700M (when not restricted) Subject to Global Gag Rule cycles
UNFPA total expenditure ~USD 1.0–1.1B Includes significant humanitarian component
FCDO bilateral SRHR ~USD 200–300M Consistent; subject to domestic political cycles
European Commission Significant but cross-cutting; estimated ~USD 100–200M in SRHR-specific Through development and humanitarian instruments
Nordic bilaterals (Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Netherlands) combined ~USD 300–400M High core/unearmarked proportion
World Bank health financing (SRHR-relevant component) Difficult to isolate; HNP portfolio ~USD 10–15B total; SRHR share estimated at ~USD 1–2B Primarily loans and grants to governments
Gates Foundation ~USD 150–300M in family planning and reproductive health Includes significant research funding
MSI and IPPF combined programme spending ~USD 400–600M Service delivery networks

Total international SRHR financing estimate: approximately USD 3–4 billion per year in direct SRHR-specific investment. This compares to the ICPD PoA benchmark of USD 21.7 billion per year (including domestic financing). Even accounting for substantial domestic financing in recipient countries, the ICPD benchmark has never been met.

KEY DEBATES AND CONTESTED QUESTIONS

Is there too much fragmentation in the SRHR architecture? The case for consolidation: fewer actors with clearer mandates would reduce coordination costs and improve accountability. The case against: the current diversity of actors reflects genuine diversity of function (normative vs. operational; multilateral vs. bilateral; UN vs. NGO) and any significant consolidation would require political agreement that is not currently achievable.

Does the World Bank's economic framing of health investment crowd out rights-based approaches? Critics argue that when health investment is justified through the human capital/economic productivity lens (as the Bank's Human Capital Project does), the rights dimension is instrumentalised — health is valuable because it increases GDP, not because it is a right. UNFPA's normative role includes resisting this instrumentalisation, but it also uses economic arguments (demographic dividend) when politically convenient. The tension is genuine and is replicated within UNFPA's own advocacy.

Does the Global Gag Rule cause net harm to SRHR programmes? The weight of available evidence — from Guttmacher, from USAID's own evaluation mechanisms, from independent researchers — is that the Global Gag Rule causes service disruption, reduced contraceptive access, and increased rates of unintended pregnancy in affected countries. The mechanism is clear: organisations that provide or advocate for abortion lose US funding; they reduce services; access declines. Whether the US has legitimate grounds to condition its foreign assistance on this criterion is a political and legal question on which there is genuine disagreement; the empirical effect on SRHR outcomes is less contested.

Are bilateral NGO implementers more effective than UNFPA at service delivery? The evidence is genuinely mixed. MSI's social franchise and outreach models have strong unit cost and coverage evidence in some contexts. UNFPA's government systems approach has stronger sustainability evidence in contexts where government capacity is real. The answer is highly context-dependent, and the appropriate choice of implementation modality should be driven by context rather than institutional preference.

Is the H6 fit for purpose? Critics argue that the H6 is a lowest-common-denominator coordination mechanism that allows UN agencies to present a unified face while avoiding real resolution of their competitive dynamics. Supporters argue it has produced meaningful joint advocacy and has prevented the worst coordination failures. The empirical evidence on H6 effectiveness is limited, and the answer likely varies by crisis context and by the quality of leadership within the group at a given time.

IMPLICATIONS BY AUDIENCE

For Frontline Staff

Mapping the actors in the SRHR space in your country context before designing a programme is not optional. At minimum, before a programme design process, a country office should know: which UN agencies are present and what they are doing; which bilateral donors are running separate bilateral programmes and through whom; which international NGOs are operating independently (MSI, IPPF member association, FHI 360, PSI); and what the World Bank is financing in the health sector.

This mapping is not just about avoiding duplication — it is about identifying complementarity. UNFPA's rights-based contraceptive programme should complement, not compete with, MSI's clinical service delivery. UNFPA's GBV coordination mandate under the GBV AoR means it should be convening other actors, not doing all the GBV work itself.

The H6 UN system coordination mechanism, where active at country level, is the appropriate forum for managing UN agency coordination. But H6 at country level is only as effective as its members make it. Passive participation produces lowest-common-denominator coordination; active, strategic engagement produces genuine joint programming benefits.

Understanding the Global Gag Rule's effects is operational knowledge. In periods when the Gag Rule is in effect (currently, from January 2025), the USAID-funded NGO landscape in your country will be significantly restructured — some organisations will have lost funding; some will have signed the Gag Rule; others will have refused and lost US funding. Knowing who has and has not signed, and what the implications are for service delivery coverage in your country, is critical for UNFPA's humanitarian and development planning.

For Decision-Makers and Funders

The SRHR architecture as a whole is under-resourced relative to the ICPD benchmarks. Total international SRHR financing (approximately USD 3–4 billion per year) is substantially below the estimated need. The strategic question for any major donor is not which single organisation to fund, but how to construct a portfolio that addresses the full range of functions — normative, operational, accountability, advocacy, research — that the architecture needs.

A funding portfolio that only supports implementation (UNFPA, MSI) but not research and evidence generation (Population Council, Guttmacher, academic institutions) or accountability (PMNCH) or coordination (H6 capacity) will produce an architecture with operational capacity but insufficient evidence and accountability. A portfolio that only funds advocacy and research but not implementation produces the opposite problem.

Understanding the Global Gag Rule's portfolio implications is a strategic funder requirement. When US funding withdraws from specific organisations, European donors face a choice: compensate broadly (maintaining the overall architecture) or be selective (supporting specific programme areas). The evidence suggests that broad compensation is more effective for system resilience, but it requires coordination among European donors that has historically been imperfect.

For Researchers

The multi-actor SRHR architecture is a rich case study for international relations and global governance scholarship. The specific dynamics — regime complexity, institutional overlap, competitive coordination, the role of large bilateral donors in shaping multilateral organisation behaviour — are well-suited to comparative institutional analysis.

The Global Gag Rule's effects offer one of the cleanest natural experiments in global health policy: a policy that turns on and off at US election intervals, affecting a specific set of organisations, in a specific programme area, across many countries. The existing research (Guttmacher estimates; academic studies in journals including Global Health: Science and Practice and the Lancet) provides a baseline; there are opportunities for more rigorous causal identification using administrative data from affected countries.

The H6 coordination mechanism is understudied. Comparative analysis of joint versus separate UN programming in the same country contexts, using programme evaluation data, could provide evidence on whether H6-facilitated coordination produces measurable programme efficiency gains.

The World Bank's role in shaping health system priorities in recipient countries — and its relationship to rights-based SRHR norms — is an important but underresearched area. The Bank's commitment to rights-based family planning in its policies (which has strengthened over time) versus its operational practice (which is mediated through country government preferences) is a principal-agent question worth investigating.

CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

The SRHR architecture is under multiple simultaneous pressures as of 2025–2026:

US withdrawal: The reinstatement of the Global Gag Rule in January 2025 and broader US foreign assistance cuts under the Trump administration represent the most significant donor withdrawal since the 2017–2020 period, and potentially more severe given the scale of the broader US foreign assistance restructuring. The cascading effects on UNFPA, on NGO implementing partners, and on country-level SRHR service delivery are significant and ongoing.

Humanitarian demand growth: The number of people in humanitarian crisis requiring SRHR services continues to grow — driven by conflict, climate-related displacement, and fragile state failures. UNFPA's humanitarian portfolio, and the humanitarian SRHR architecture more broadly, faces structural underfunding relative to need.

Digital health transformation: Multiple actors in the SRHR architecture are developing digital health strategies — telemedicine for reproductive health, mobile health information, digital supply chain management, AI-assisted clinical decision support. The governance of digital health data and the equity implications of digital approaches are becoming significant issues.

Climate-SRHR intersection: The connection between climate change and SRHR outcomes — through displacement, heat stress in pregnancy, disaster disruption of health services, and food insecurity — is growing and is increasingly recognised in the strategic plans of UNFPA, WHO, and bilateral donors. The programmatic responses are still emerging.

South-south cooperation and domestic resource mobilisation: As traditional bilateral aid budgets face political pressure, there is increasing attention to south-south technical cooperation (developing countries learning from each other) and domestic resource mobilisation (recipient governments funding more of their own SRHR programmes). Both UNFPA and bilateral donors are increasingly emphasising these approaches, but their practical potential to substitute for international financing in low-income countries in the near term is limited.

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